Policy implications of learning from more accurate Central Bank Forecasts by Hubert, Paul
   
 
 
 
Volume 35, Issue 1
 
Policy implications of learning from more accurate central bank forecasts
 
Paul Hubert 
OFCE - Sciences Po
Abstract
How might central bank communication of its internal forecasts assist the conduct of monetary policy? The literature
has shown that heterogeneous expectations may have destabilizing effects on aggregate dynamics. This paper
analyzes through adaptive learning the policy implications of central bank influence of private forecasts stemming
from more accurate central bank forecasts. In this case, the central bank must only respect the Taylor principle to
ensure macroeconomic stability, in contrast to the situation where private agents are learning from less accurate
central bank forecasts.
I thank the Editor, an anonymous referee, Camille Cornand, Jérôme Creel, Hubert Kempf and Francesco Saraceno for helpful comments, as
well as seminar participants at Sciences Po, the 2010 Annual Congress of the French Economic Association, OFCE, the 27th GDRE
Symposium, the 2011 T2M conference, the 15th ICMAIF conference and the 2011 EEA Annual Conference. All remaining errors are mine.
Email: paul.hubert@sciencespo.fr. Address: OFCE – Sciences Po, 69 quai d'Orsay, 75007 Paris, France. Telephone: +33144185427.
Citation: Paul Hubert, (2015) ''Policy implications of learning from more accurate central bank forecasts'', Economics Bulletin, Volume 35,
Issue 1, pages 466-474
Contact: Paul Hubert - paul.hubert@sciencespo.fr.
Submitted: January 27, 2014.   Published: March 11, 2015.
 
   
 1. Introduction 
 
Since the beginning of the nineties, most of the central banks have become more 
transparent. The publication of macroeconomic projections has become a widespread 
practice among them, including inflation targeting central banks, the Federal Reserve, 
and the ECB. On the other hand, private expectations play a central role in 
macroeconomics because of their importance in determining ex-ante real interest rates, 
and both current and future inflation and output by driving consumption and 
investment decisions. 
  
This paper analyses, under adaptive learning and using the expectational stability (E-
stability) criterion, how central bank communication of internal forecasts may affect the 
conduct of monetary policy when central bank forecasts are more accurate than private 
forecasts. Muto (2011) analyses the E-stability conditions when private agents condition 
their forecasts on central bank forecasts. However, the alternative forecast of private 
agents is the sample average of the inflation rate, meaning that they form their 
expectations based on a combination of past average inflation and the central bank 
forecast. This consistently biases private forecasts upward adding their own estimation 
error to central bank forecast errors.  
 
The contribution of this paper is to extend the analysis of Muto (2011) to a framework in 
which central bank forecasts are influential because they are more accurate than private 
forecasts, and in which the forecasting function of private agents is more realistic as it 
includes their information set, central bank forecasts, and the average past inflation.  
 
More accurate central bank forecasts are defined as forecasts with a smaller mean 
squared forecast error. This paper’s framework is similar to Muto (2011) except that it 
introduces an additional shock – cost push shocks – into the framework of Muto (2011) 
with only demand shocks. More accurate forecasts are obtained because the central bank 
observes both shocks, while private agents only the demand one. Assessing for 
simplicity the limit case when private expectations converges to central bank ones, our 
main assumption to model more accurate forecasts is that private agents put a weight 
equal to unity on central bank forecasts in equilibrium. We abstract from the possibility 
that central bank forecasts might provide information on the future path of interest 
rates. 
 
The framework used is the standard New-Keynesian (NK) model (Clarida et al. 1999) 
which gives a central role for inflation and output expectations. Using adaptive 
learning, a consequent literature has analysed the effects of heterogeneous expectations 
(Evans and Honkapohja 1997, Giannitsarou 2003, McCallum and Nelson 2004, 
Honkapohja and Mitra 2005, 2006, Granato et al. 2008, Preston 2008) and of information 
asymmetry (Honkapohja and Mitra 2004) on E-stability. 
 
The main result of this paper is that satisfying the Taylor principle is sufficient to reach 
E-stability and determinacy when central bank forecasts are more accurate than private 
ones. This outcome is not surprising and is consistent with Bullard and Mitra (2002) 
since the Taylor principle is a sufficient condition for the E-stability when the central 
bank and private agents form homogeneous expectations. In this framework, the 
forecast heterogeneity at the starting point disappears in equilibrium as private agents 
and the central bank use the same learning algorithm and the former follow central 
 bank forecasts, due to their lower forecast errors.  The present result is different from 
Muto (2011) because the forecast heterogeneity between the central bank and private 
agents disappears when private agents do not rely only on the average inflation and the 
central bank has more accurate forecasts. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the overall framework, 
while Section 3 the assumptions and conditions for stability and determinacy. Section 4 
concludes. 
 
2. The Framework 
 
Compared to rational expectations (RE) based on the hypothesis that agents know the 
correct equilibrium probabilities laws and the model of the economy, the learning 
approach assumes that agents form their expectations as econometricians by estimating 
and updating reduced-form forecasting models in real time. 
 
2.1 A standard NK model 
 
The aggregate demand curve obtained by log-linearizing the Euler equation, the 
aggregate supply curve derived as a linearization of the firms’ optimality condition 
under the price setting constraint, and the forward-looking interest rate rule derived by 
maximizing a policy objective function of a quadratic form are:  
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where xt is the output gap, Ǒt the inflation rate, it the nominal interest rate, gt   the  
demand shock and ut  the cost-push shock. PAtE  and 
CB
tE  are private and central bank 
expectations respectively. φ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ǌ the elasticity 
of inflation to output and β the discount factor.   and x  represent the central bank 
responses to inflation and the output gap. These structural parameters satisfy ǌ>0, φ>0 
and 0<β<1.1 gt and ut are uncorrelated and i.i.d. shocks and follow these processes: 
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The model can be written under the following reduced-form: 
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2.2 Adaptive Learning 
 
In the adaptive learning framework, agents do not know the true values of the structural 
parameters. Uncertainty regards the reduced-form equilibrium dynamics of aggregate 
variables following stochastic shocks and how shocks get mapped into inflation and 
                                                 
1 We exclude from the analysis the unlikely case in which ǌ = 0 and Φx = 0, so inflation is unaffected by gt. 
 output. Agents are assumed to estimate a perceived law of motion (PLM) using 
recursive least squares (RLS) on past and current data to obtain parameter estimates: 
   t t t t t t t ty a bw with y x ' and w g u '( , ) ( , )  
 
Given the parameters estimated and the observed shocks, agents form forecasts:: 
i
t t t t t t t t tE y a bFw with y x ' and w g u '1 ( , ) ( , )      
 
By introducing homogenous expectations - CB PAt t t tE y E y1 1   - in (4), we obtain the actual 
law of motion (ALM) that describes a temporary equilibrium of the economy: 
PA CB PA CB
t ty D A A a A A bF B w( ) (( ) )                                              (5) 
 
The conditions of convergence of the model are given by the local stability conditions of 
the associated ordinary differential equations (ODE). Evans and Honkapohja (2001) 
shows that the local stability is determined by this ODE: 
 d d T/ ( )                                                                    (6) 
where is “notional” time and T( )  is the mapping function (T-maps) from PLM to 
ALM. The E-stability depends on the local stability of this ODE under RLS learning, and 
defines the convergence of estimations under adaptive learning towards the 
fundamental values of these parameters under RE. The equilibrium is E-stable if all 
eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of the function mapping the PLM to the ALM have 
negative real parts. The T-maps are: 
PA CBT a D A A a( ) ( )                                                              (7) 
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Bullard and Mitra (2002) show that with a forward-looking interest rule the derivations 
of E-stability conditions yield to the following inequality: 
1 1x( ) ( )                                                                    (9) 
which is the Taylor principle put forward by Taylor (1993) and Woodford (2001). It is 
the necessary and sufficient condition for the E-stability of this model. 
 
3. Central Bank Influence from More Accurate Forecasts 
 
3.1 Assumptions 
 
Assumption 1: the central bank observes both shocks the economy face, while the private 
agents only observe demand shocks.  
 
This assumption of asymmetric information in favour of the central enables modelling 
more accurate central bank forecasts compared to private agents, which is the main 
assumption of this model.2 The key corollary is that private agents put a weight equal to 
unity on central bank forecasts, whereas the weight given to the shock they observe – 
and share with the central bank – is equal to zero.3 
                                                 
2 This paper does not support that all central banks have more accurate forecasts, but that some central 
banks may have (see Romer and Romer 2000, for the US, or Hubert 2014, for inflation targeting countries). 
3 Private agents cannot infer from interest rate setting the shock they do not observe. The interest rate is 
perfectly observed but not the interest rate rule parameters. This is consistent with both the learning 
framework and the heterogeneity of monetary policy rule parameters in the literature. 
 Assumption 2: in each period, the central bank publishes its current-period CBt tE y  and 
one-period-ahead 1CBt tE y   expectations and private agents form their forecasts after the 
publication of central bank ones. 
 
Private agents should be able to incorporate central bank forecasts in their forecasting 
function (see Figure A). We assume that both PLM are estimated with past data. This is 
to avoid the simultaneity between the determination of private agents’ beliefs and the 
true data generating process of fundamental variables. 
 
Figure A: the timing of actions 
 
 
 
3.2 The Model and E-Stability Conditions 
 
The PLM of the central bank is  
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The forecasting function of the central bank, when shocks at date t are available, is then: 
1CB CB CB CBt t g t u tE y a b g b u                                                       (12) 
 
The core difference with Muto (2011)4 stems from the PLM of private agents which here 
include their own information set and takes the following form: 
1 1 1 1PA PA PA CBt t t ty a b g c E y                                                           (13) 
And, since current-period expectations are 1 1 1 1CB CB CB CBt t g t u tE y a b g b u        , can be written  
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4 See his equation (18). The timing of the central bank's expectation is also different to comply with the 
timing of information publication and the data generating process of fundamental variables as show in 
Figure A. 
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The PLM of private agents is based on the shock they observe and the central bank 
forecast. Their forecasting function is then: 
1 1PA PA PA PA CBt t t t tE y a b g c E y                                                 (15) 
and can be written5 
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Introducing central bank and private forecasts in (4) and supposing without loss of 
generality that 0 0   and so 0D  , the ALM of the economy is then: 
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Following Evans and Honkapohja (2003), the T-maps defining E-stability derived from 
the correspondence between PLM to ALM are then: 
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The equations for CB PAa a( , ) , CB PAgb b( , )  and
CB PA
ub c( , )  are independent of each other. 
Following Honkapohja and Mitra (2006), the E-stability of the subsystems is satisfied if 
and only if all the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of M1, M2 and M3 have negative real parts.  
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Proposition: The model is E-stable under learning if all eigenvalues of the following 
matrix PA CBA A I   have negative real parts. It corresponds to the following inequality: 
1 1x( ) ( )                                                                (24) 
 
The proof is in the Appendix.6 This condition is the Taylor principle, the condition for 
stability with homogenous forecasts. At the steady state, homogeneous expectations 
between private agents and the central bank are the same as those of the MSV solution 
of the model. The analysis of central bank influence from more accurate forecasts is then 
                                                 
5 Note that ut now appears in the equation (16) because of central bank forecasts. 
6 If private agents only observe the cost-push shock ut (rather than gt), the condition for stability related to 
central bank responses is the same as above and the second condition related to the economy structure 
shown in the Appendix is also similar, with Ǎ replacing ǒ. 
 directly related to the analysis of heterogeneous expectations and how central bank may 
render expectations homogeneous.7  
 
3.3 Determinacy 
 
We now focus on the determinacy condition defining the uniqueness of the equilibrium. 
This issue matters when the policy rule comprises forward-looking components as it 
may raise the possibility of sunspot equilibrium (see Bernanke and Woodford, 1997). 
Blanchard and Kahn (1980) show that the equation (4) can be rewritten: 
1PA CBt t t ty D A A E y B w( )                                                      (25) 
and the standard RE determinacy condition is 1PA CBA A| |  , and leads to: 
1 1 1x x( ) ( ) ( )                                                            (26) 
 
In this framework, the determinacy condition is similar to (26), and is a sufficient 
condition for the E-stability of the equilibrium. This is consistent with McCallum (2007) 
that shows that in a forward-looking model where the current period information set is 
available to agents to form their forecasts through adaptive learning, the determinacy 
condition is sufficient for E-stability. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This paper shows that, in a situation of central bank influence from more accurate 
forecasts, the central bank must only respect the Taylor principle and need not be more 
restrictive to ensure macroeconomic stability. A policy implication of this work is that 
influencing private expectations should not be an objective per se and central banks 
should rather increase the quality of their macroeconomic forecasts they communicate 
to the public to reach macroeconomic stability at a lower cost. 
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 Appendix 
 
The T-maps defining E-stability and derived from PLM to ALM are then: 
CB PA PA PA CB CB CBT a A a c a A a( ) ( )                                             (18) 
PA PA PA PA CB CB CB PA CBT a A a c a A a c a( ) ( )                                      (19) 
CB PA PA PA CB CB CB
g g g gT b A b c b A b B( ) ( ( ) )                                       (20) 
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u u u uT b A c b A b B( ) ( )                                            (22) 
1PA PA PA CB CB
u uT c A c A B b( ) ( ) ( )                                             (23) 
 
The expectational stability (E-stability) of the ALM is satisfied if these T-maps are locally 
stable, what is satisfied if and only if all eigenvalues of the Jacobian of M1, M2 and M3 
have negative real parts. Those Jacobian matrices are computed at the equilibrium 
values 2 1,CB CBu gb Jb  , Jn,m being the nxm unit matrix, deriving from the assumption that 
aPA=bPA=02,1 and cPA= J2,2, 0n,m being the nxm zero matrix. 
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Following Honkapohja and Mitra (2006), the determinant for computing the eigenvalues 
of J1, J2 and J3 may be simplified as follows 
1det( )
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After subtracting the second row from the first, the computation shows that J1 has 
eigenvalues with negative real parts if and only if PA CBA A I  has the same property. 
Similarly, we obtain: 
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After subtracting the second row from the first, the computation shows that J2 has 
eigenvalues with negative real parts if and only if PA CBA A I( )   has the same property. 
Because 0 1  , it suffices to have only the eigenvalues of PA CBA A I   for E-stability. 
The necessary and sufficient condition of J2 is therefore similar to the one for J1. 
 
 As the system of M3 is not linear, the Jacobian J3 is analyzed differently. For CBub , the 
standard E-stability arguments apply and yield to the same property than for J1 and J2, 
because 0 1  . For PAc , the E-stability condition is PAA I  .  
 
For the special case of a 2× 2 matrix A, it can be shown that the condition that both roots 
of A have negative real parts is equivalent to the condition that the trace of A is negative 
and the determinant of A is positive. Thus, all the eigenvalues of PA CBA A I   have 
negative real parts if and only if the two conditions apply. It corresponds to the 
following inequalities: 
0x x                                                            (27) 
1 0x                                                              (28) 
 
If (27) holds then (28) holds. The E-stability condition corresponds to (27) and can be 
written: 
1 1x( ) ( )                                                                (24) 
 
The second condition needs   the autocorrelation of the cost push shock to be 
sufficiently small as PAA  has an eigenvalue higher than one (see Honkapohja and Mitra 
(2004) for more details), but has no effect on the policy responses to inflation or output 
to reach E-stability. 
 
